Turkey and the US in the Middle East by Gürcan Balik

Author:Gürcan Balik [Balik, Gürcan]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, Iraq War (2003-2011), Political Science, International Relations, Diplomacy, General, Modern, 20th Century
ISBN: 9781786720818
Google: M7mKDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Published: 2016-05-26T01:12:29+00:00

Turkey's Action Plan on Iraq Strategy, December 2002

In late December, a political process over whether and to what extent to meet US requests for full and complete support for military action began to take shape. At the strategic level, it was a matter of striking a balance between contradictory objectives. The Turkish public and the political parties, including a large portion of the AKP, overwhelmingly opposed the war. Ankara recognised the need for Iraq's disarmament, yet did not share Washington's perception of the urgency of the threat from Saddam's regime. For many in Turkey, the course to war was less an attempt to ensure Iraq's disarmament than the initial step in a grand strategy to redesign the Middle East by the neo-cons in the US administration. The most pressing questions were whether Turkey could do anything to prevent a war, such as convincing Iraq to fully comply with its disarmament obligations, or whether such compliance would indeed persuade the US to alter its course. Turkey had no power of veto over US military action, irrespective of whether it extended full, limited or no support. Should the US opt for military action, Turkey would see serious negative consequences on its economy, on the regional balance of power and stability, and in northern Iraq, potentially including a large refugee inflow, increased PKK activities, a Kurdish drive for independence, or a Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk. In the event of military hostilities, cooperation with the US seemed the only way to address these negative consequences, and make Turkey a player on the ground, participating in shaping Iraq's future. Furthermore, Ankara recognised that Washington viewed the accommodation of US requests as a test of the strategic relationship. The dilemma was how to maintain the strategic partnership with the US when 95 per cent of the public opposed war.123 The real challenge would centre on convincing the TBMM and the public of the necessity of supporting the US war on Iraq. This predicament, as Park has observed, was a ‘duality in Turkish policy’.124 However, cooperation with the US still appeared to be the least costly and most rational choice under the circumstances.

The challenge of making a political decision on the conditions and scope of Turkey's cooperation was discussed at the December MGK meeting. First, it was a constitutional requirement that, for Turkey to support US military action, that action had to have international legitimacy established by a second UNSCR explicitly mandating the use of force. Second, the government had to follow the democratic process, taking into account the views of the TBMM, the AKP, the CHP, and public opinion. Third, as the war would have significant consequences for the regional balance of power, Gül would visit regional countries for consultations on Iraq. Fourth, the government would seek, at an appropriate time, TBMM approval for a course of action that would not deprive the US, its strategic ally, of the Northern Option, but would also limit Turkish support subject to certain conditions. Ankara would grant permission for

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.